June 2023

What Triggers Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Renegotiations in the United States?

Eoin Reeves (ed), University of Limerick, Ireland

Article by Jonathan L. Gifford, Lisardo A. Bolaños, Nobuhiko Daito & Carter B. Casady.

The frequency of renegotiations in PPPs, especially in Latin America and Europe, has attracted attention from policymakers, scholars, and the public alike.  Renegotiations broadly refer to any ex-post modifications in the PPP contract, and the outcomes of these renegotiations may include contract termination/nationalization, refinancing, and restructurings from bankruptcy.  Studies show that slightly over half of transportation PPPs in Latin America and Europe undergo renegotiations, often creating multimillion-dollar contingent liabilities on government balance sheets.

Login to unlock
Unlock this article
Related Articles
The Governance of Affordable Housing Through Public-Private Partnerships: Critical Entanglements

June 2024

The Governance of Affordable Housing Through Public-Private Partnerships: Critical Entanglements

Determinants of Public-Private Partnership Governance Structures: Evidence from India

May 2024

Determinants of Public-Private Partnership Governance Structures: Evidence from India

Public-Private Partnerships: Is a Reassessment Underway?

April 2024

Public-Private Partnerships: Is a Reassessment Underway?

Public-Private Partnerships in the Gulf Cooperation Council Region: Policy Discussions, Projects, Regulatory Frameworks, and Future Directions

March 2024

Public-Private Partnerships in the Gulf Cooperation Council Region: Policy Discussions, Projects, Regulatory Frameworks, and Future Directions

PPP performance evaluation: the social welfare goal, principal–agent theory and political economy (Part II)

February 2024

PPP performance evaluation: the social welfare goal, principal–agent theory and political economy (Part II)

PPP performance evaluation: the social welfare goal, principal–agent theory and political economy (Part I)

January 2024

PPP performance evaluation: the social welfare goal, principal–agent theory and political economy (Part I)