December 2022

The Performance of Public-Private Partnerships: An Evaluation of 15 Years DBFM in Dutch Infrastructure Governance

Eoin Reeves (ed), University of Limerick, Ireland

This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the performance of PPP projects in the Netherlands.  It concentrates on Dutch road and waterway infrastructure projects governed by DBFM contracts and evaluates ex-post realized PPP performance compared to traditional procurement.  The chosen performance criteria are cost, time, quality, and innovation.  The article also evaluates five dominant explanations or drivers of the expected higher performance of PPPs that are often mentioned in the literature: private financing, performance-dependent payments, bundling (i.e., the integrated nature of contracts), risk transfer, and collaboration.

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