February 2023

The European Investment Bank as Policy Entrepreneur and the Promotion of Public – Private Partnerships

Eoin Reeves (ed), University of Limerick, Ireland

Article by Moritz Liebe & David Howarth

This paper focuses on the important role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the European Union’s promotion of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).  The EIB as the EU’s main lending body has provided senior debt to PPP-like projects since the late 1980s and is regarded as one of the biggest single lenders to such schemes in Europe.  The paper demonstrates the relative importance of the EIB in relation to the European Commission (the executive of the European Union) on the promotion of PPPs and asks how should the EIB’s role in PPP promotion best be understood?

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